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1. Introduction 
Over recent years the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court” or “the ECtHR”) has 
become increasingly involved in identifying, either in the text of its judgments or in the 
operative part of those judgments, remedial measures to respondent States going 
beyond the payment of just satisfaction to successful applicants. This study will examine 
the Court’s evolving role in seeking to secure non-financial redress for applicants who 
have established violations of their rights and freedoms under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“the Convention” or “the ECHR”) and its Protocols.1 The pilot 
judgment process2 will not be included in this study as it has a distinct origin in a 
Committee of Ministers’ (of the Council of Europe) Resolution3, together with an express 
elaboration in the Rules of Court4 and therefore can be seen as a different category of 
judgment.5 Whereas our focus is on those fascinating judgments where the Court has 
indicated non-financial remedial measures without invoking the pilot judgment 
procedure. We shall trace the historical development of these cases, the Court’s reasons 
and justifications for indicating non-financial remedial measures, what factors influence 
the Court in determining whether to indicate remedial measures in the text of judgments 
or in the operative section of judgments and the legal foundations of these remedial 
measures. 
 
2. The Court’s changing approach to the indication of remedial measures 
                                           
1 For my early examination of the financial remedies awarded by the Court see, A. 
Mowbray, “The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Just Satisfaction” [1997] 
Public Law 647. Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque has recently argued that punitive 
(exemplary) damages are a “necessary instrument for fulfilling the Court’s mission to 
uphold human rights in Europe and ensuring the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.” 
“Punitive Damages in Strasbourg”, University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.2016-05 (May 2016) at p. 20. 
Thanks to my colleague Professor Dirk Van Zyl Smit for alerting me to this paper. 
 
2 See A. Mowbray, Cases, Materials & Commentary on the ECHR, 3rd edn (2012) at 54-
57 and for a study of this type of judgments, P. Leach et al, Responding to Systematic 
Human Rights Violations, (2010). 
 
3 Res (2004)3 which, inter alia, encouraged the Court to highlight “…in its judgments 
finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an underlying systemic 
problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to 
numerous applications, so as to assist States in finding the appropriate solution and the 
Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments.” 
 
4 Rule 61 “Pilot- judgment procedure”, Rules of Court, 1 June 2015, Strasbourg. 
 
5 For example the Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers on the Supervision of the 
Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights nowadays 
contains separate Appendix sections listing final pilot judgments and  final “judgments 
with indications of relevance for the execution (under Article 46)”; infra n.28. 
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As Judge Nicolaou has perceptively observed the early jurisprudence disclosed that the 
original Court considered that its judgments were generally declaratory.6  For example, 
in Marckx v Belgium7, the Plenary Court stated that: the Court’s judgment is essentially 
declaratory and leaves to the State the choice of the means to be utilised in its domestic 
legal system for performance of its obligation under Article 53 [now 46].”8  Hence the 
Court could not annul or repeal the provisions of Belgian law that violated the 
Convention rights of the mother and daughter applicants. Similarly in Airey v Ireland9, 
the Court ruled that: 
In addition, whilst Article 6 para. 1 guarantees to litigants an effective right of 
access to the courts for the determination of their "civil rights and obligations", it 
leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end. The 
institution of a legal aid scheme - which Ireland now envisages in family law 
matters … - constitutes one of those means but there are others such as, for 
example, a simplification of procedure. In any event, it is not the Court’s function 
to indicate, let alone dictate, which measures should be taken; all that the 
Convention requires is that an individual should enjoy his effective right of access 
to the courts in conditions not at variance with Article 6 para. 1…10  
Therefore, the Court’s remedial focus was primarily on whether to order the payment of 
financial just satisfaction to successful applicants. 
 Later, in the Court’s reserved just satisfaction judgment concerning 
Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece11, the Court, in the operative part, ruled that 
Greece should (within six months) return the applicants’ land to them or failing 
restitution the State should pay a specified amount of compensation for pecuniary 
damage to the applicants. Judge Nicolaou characterised this as establishing “a new 
practice”12 whereby the Court would be willing to order property restitution in favour of 
successful applicants, who had invoked Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, where it 
appeared feasible coupled with a fixed amount of pecuniary compensation should the 
State not return the specified property. This was an early form of specific individual 
measures of redress being indicated by the Court. 
 The Grand Chamber of the full-time Court made a significant expansion in the 
Court’s willingness to indicate individual remedial measures in two major judgments 
issued during 2004. Assanidze v Georgia13, concerned the continuing imprisonment of 
the applicant, by Ajarian Autonomous Republic authorities in Georgia, despite the 
President of Georgia having granted him a pardon and the Georgian Supreme Court 
quashing the applicant’s convictions and ordering his release. The Grand Chamber held 
that: 
                                           
6 G. Nicolaou, “The New Perspective of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
Effectiveness of its Judgments” 31 HRLJ 269 (2011). 
 
7 Judgment of 13 June 1979. 
 
8 Ibid. at para 58. 
 
9 Judgment of 9 October 1979. 
 
10 Ibid. at para 26. 
 
11 Judgment of 31 October 1995. 
 
12 Supra n.6 at p. 271. 
 
13 Judgment of 8 April 2004. 
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198. …in the context of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of 
the Convention14, a judgment in which it finds a breach imposes on the respondent 
State a legal obligation under that provision to put an end to the breach and to 
make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible 
the situation existing before the breach. If, on the other hand, national law does 
not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of 
the breach, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such 
satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment 
in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on 
the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums 
awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by 
the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures 
to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the 
Court and make all feasible reparation for its consequences in such a way as to 
restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach... 
 
202. As regards the measures which the Georgian State must take (see paragraph 
198 above), subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, in order to put 
an end to the violation that has been found, the Court reiterates that its judgments 
are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is primarily for the 
State concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order in 
order to discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided 
that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's 
judgment (see, among other authorities, … Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 
June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 25, § 58). This discretion as to the manner of 
execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached to the primary 
obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed (Article 1) (see, mutatis mutandis, Papamichalopoulos and 
Others v. Greece (Article 50), judgment of 31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, 
pp. 58-59, § 34). 
However, by its very nature, the violation found in the instant case does not leave 
any real choice as to the measures required to remedy it. 
 
203. In these conditions, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case 
and the urgent need to put an end to the violation of Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 § 1 
of the Convention… the Court considers that the respondent State must secure the 
applicant's release at the earliest possible date.15 
The unanimous Grand Chamber went on to repeat that final order in the operative part 
of its judgment16. 
 Exactly three months later another Grand Chamber, including ten judges who sat 
in Assanidze, gave judgment in Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia17. The latter 
case was brought by four Moldovan nationals regarding their detention and ill-treatment 
by the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” authorities (a separatist regime based in 
the east of Moldova which is supported by Russia, but not recognised by the 
international community). The Grand Chamber repeated, verbatim, its view on the duties 
                                           
14 This provides:”(1) The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. (2) The final judgment of 
the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its 
execution. …”. 
 
15 Supra n. 13 at paras 198-203. 
 
16 Ibid. point 14. 
 
17 Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
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of respondent States under Article 46 elaborated in paragraph 198 (above) of 
Assanidze.18 Then, taking account of its findings that Moldova had failed to discharge its 
Convention positive obligations19 towards the applicants and Russia had not taken steps 
to prevent the applicants continued unlawful detention and ill-treatment: 
The Court further considers that any continuation of the unlawful and arbitrary 
detention of the three applicants would necessarily entail a serious prolongation of 
the violation of Article 5 found by the Court and a breach of the respondent States' 
obligation under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention to abide by the Court's judgment. 
Regard being had to the grounds on which they have been found by the Court to 
be in violation of the Convention … the respondent States must take every 
measure to put an end to the arbitrary detention of the applicants still detained 
and to secure their immediate release.20 
Again, the Grand Chamber, unanimously, repeated the latter order in the operative part 
of its judgment.21 
 The above two judgments were major milestones in the Court’s evolving role in 
providing respondent States with precise indications of the remedial measure they 
should take. As in Papamichalopoulos the Grand Chamber included its remedial guidance 
to the respondent States in the operative parts of these judgments. However, the nature 
of the individual measures required in the latter cases, to secure the swift release of the 
applicants from unlawful detention, were of a different kind to the property restitution 
ordered in Papamichalopoulos. The importance of Assanidze and Ilascu in the remedial 
history of the Court was recognised in the Committee of Ministers’ first annual report on 
its role of supervising the execution of Court judgments. The report observed that: “The 
ECtHR may also order the required individual execution measure. The first cases 
addressing situations of this kind were decided by the ECtHR in 2004, and in both cases 
the ECtHR ordered the release of applicants who were being arbitrarily detained.”22 In its 
second annual report the Committee of Ministers added that: “The Court had previously 
developed some practice in this direction in certain property cases by indicating in the 
operative provisions that states could choose between restitution and compensation – 
see e.g. the Papamichalopoulos and Others judgment of 31 October 1995 (Article 50).”23 
 The Court’s expanding role in the indication of remedial measures was noted by 
the Committee of Ministers in its 2011 supervision annual report. 
32. The Court’s interaction with the Committee of Ministers in the application of 
Article 46 is in constant evolution. Since a number of years the Court has thus 
more and more frequently started to assist the execution process in a number of 
ways, e.g. by providing also itself guidance as to relevant execution measures in its 
judgments. 
33. The Court today provides such recommendations in respect of individual 
measures in a growing number of cases. It may also, in certain circumstances, 
where the State does not have any real choice as to the execution measures 
required, directly itself order the taking of the relevant measure. For example in 
                                           
18 Ibid. at para 487. 
 
19 More generally see A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the 
ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights (2004). 
 
20 Supra n.17 at para 490. 
 
21 Ibid. point 22. 
 
22 Supervision of the execution of judgments of the ECtHR, 1st Annual Report 2007, 
Strasbourg, March 2008, p.17. 
 
23 Supervision of the execution of judgments of the ECtHR, 2nd  Annual Report 2008, 
Strasbourg, April 2009, p.19 footnote 6. 
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case of arbitrary detention, restitutio in integrum will necessarily require, among 
other things, release from detention and in several cases the Court has also 
ordered such release.”24 
The report cited Fatullayev v Azerbaijan25 as another example of a judgment, this time 
by a Chamber, where the Court (by a six to one majority, intriguingly no dissenting 
opinion was issued) ordered in the operative part of its judgment that the respondent 
State should secure the applicant’s immediate release from prison. The Chamber had, 
unanimously, found violations of Article 10 in respect of the applicant journalist’s 
convictions for publishing controversial views on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
foreign- policy decisions. 
 In its 2012 supervisory annual report the Committee of Ministers replicated the 
comments in paragraph 32 of the 2011 report (above) with one fascinating addition: 
37. The European Court’s interaction with the Committee of Ministers, in 
implementing Article 46, is constantly evolving. For several years now, the Court 
contributes to the execution process more and more frequently and in various 
ways, e.g. by providing, itself, in its judgments recommendations as to relevant 
execution measures (so called quasi-pilot judgments or “Article 46 judgments”)…26 
[italics as in original text] 
The report did not define the term quasi-pilot judgments. However, writing extra-
judicially, Judge Sicilianos has observed that: “The distinction between pilot and quasi-
pilot judgments is not always clear.  …The clearest difference…seems to be of a 
procedural rather than of a substantive nature, namely that parties are invited to 
comment upon the application of the pilot judgment procedure according to Rule 61 
para.2 of the Rules of Court.”27 For the purposes of our study, as elaborated in the 
introduction, we shall be focusing on those judgments where the Court has indicated 
remedial measures in cases not designated as pilot judgments.  
 The 2013 annual supervisory report noted that whilst pilot judgments were 
“rare”28, only three became final in that year29; “…the Court has continued to deploy 
special efforts to assist execution by including in certain judgments, with reference to 
Article 46, different indications of relevance for the solution of structural problems.”30 
The report went on to disclose that the Court had delivered 11 such judgments in 2010, 
22 in 2011, 28 in 2012 and 17 in 2013.31 Hence we see that numerically there are far 
                                           
24 Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR,  Annual Report 
2011, Strasbourg, April 2012, p.19. 
 
25 Judgment of 22 April 2010. 
 
26 Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR,  6th Annual 
Report 2012, Strasbourg, April 2013, p.28. 
 
 
 
27 L-A. Sicilianos, “The Involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Implementation of its Judgments: Recent Developments Under Article 46 ECHR”, 32 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 235 (2014) at p. 240. 
 
28 Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR,  7th Annual 
Report 2013, Strasbourg, March 2014, p.11. 
 
 
29 Ibid.at p.67. 
 
30 Ibid. at p. 11. 
 
31 Ibid. footnote 4. 
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more Court judgments indicating remedial measures in quasi-pilot /Article 46 judgments 
than in formal pilot judgments. The report continued that the Court’s “support”  for 
execution via remedial indications in Article 46 judgments: “…has been well received 
both by the states concerned and the Committee of Ministers when supervising 
execution of the Court’s judgments, even if it is evident that many choices and problems 
appear only once the execution process has been engaged.32 For the first time the 2013 
annual report also included a separate statistical appendix (1.E Judgments with 
indications of relevance for execution) that listed 1. Pilot judgments final in 2013 and 2. 
Judgments with indications of relevance for the execution (under Article 46) final in 
2013. This welcome new section can be seen as another demonstration of the 
importance of these Article 46 judgments. Indeed during 2014 the Court went on to 
deliver another 23 such judgments33 and 13 further judgments were pronounced in 
201534. 
 
3. The Court’s contemporary indication of non-financial remedial measures 
Using the 2013, 2014 and 2015 supervisory annual reports lists of Article 46 judgments 
we can study these cases to discover important aspects of the Court’s contemporary 
approach to indicating remedial measures. In doing so we will, in part, be responding to 
Judge Sicilianos’ call for an “analytical study” of “this important practice”.35 The first 
question we can address is what types of remedial measures are being indicated by the 
Court in modern times? The two well-established forms of non-financial remedies under 
the ECHR are individual measures which are designed to provide redress for the 
Convention violations suffered by the specific applicant, for example securing the release 
of Assanidze36 and general measures, such as the enactment of legislation reforming the 
status of judges37, that address the systemic defects disclosed in a judgment. 
 
 
Article 46 judgments final in 2013 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Numbers of cases 4 5 8 
 
 
 
Article 46 judgments final in 2014 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Number of cases 5 1 17 
                                           
32 Ibid. at p.11. 
 
33 Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR,  8th Annual 
Report 2014, Strasbourg, March 2015, Appendix 4B.  
 
34 Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR, 9th Annual 
Report 2015, Strasbourg, March 2016, Appendix 4B. 
 
35 Supra n.27 at pp. 237-8. 
 
36 Supra n.13. 
 
37 As Ukraine did following the judgment in Oleksandr Volkov infra n.44 and see the 
European Human Rights Advocacy Centre Annual Report 2015, Middlesex University 
(2016), p.17. 
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Article 46 judgments final in 2015 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Number of cases 1 4 8 
 
So fascinatingly we learn that although much of the attention regarding the Court’s 
development of indicating remedial measures has been directed at the elaboration of 
individual measures, in recent years the most common form of indicated remedy has 
been that of general measures. This is even more remarkable when we remember that 
these are not pilot judgments which, of course, are directly concerned with cases 
revealing systemic failings that require general remedies to resolve the underlying defect 
in the national  legal or administrative arrangements. 
 The next issue we can examine is the importance level of judgments containing 
remedial indications. The Court’s HUDOC database of judgments classifies all judgments 
into four categories of importance. The Bureau of the Court (comprised of the Court’s 
President, Vice-Presidents and Section Presidents), acting on  recommendations from the 
Court’s Jurisconsult, determine the most important judgments which will be published in 
the official Reports and Decisions of the Court (“case reports”).38 “Level 1 cases” are 
classified as of “high importance” as they “make a significant contribution to the 
development, clarification or modification of the Court's case-law, either generally or in 
relation to a particular State.”39 “Level 2  cases” are those of “medium importance” 
which while not making a significant contribution to the case-law, nevertheless go 
beyond merely applying existing case-law.”40 “Level 3 cases” are deemed to be of “low 
importance” as they are of “little legal interest, namely judgments and decisions that 
simply apply existing case-law”.41 
 
 
Article 46 judgments final in 2013 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Importance Level of 
Cases: Case Reports 
1 3 1 
Level 1   2 
Level 2 3 1 5 
Level 3  1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
38 HUDOC User Manual, Strasbourg, 2012, p.11. 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
40 Ibid. at p.12. 
 
41 Ibid. 
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Article 46 judgments final in 2014 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Importance Level of 
Cases: Case Reports 
  4 
Level 1 1  2 
Level 2 2 1 11 
Level 3 2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 46 judgments final in 2015 
 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Importance Level of 
Cases: Case Reports 
   
Level 1    
Level 2 1 4 5 
Level 3   3 
 
Again these results are intriguing as they demonstrate that the indication of general 
measures is not confined to the most important categories of judgments but also 
extends down into lower levels of cases. 
 
The final aspects of the contemporary practice we shall examine statistically are the 
importance level of cases where the Court indicates remedial measures in the operative 
part of its judgments and the nature of those remedies. In these relatively rare cases the 
Court is seeking to place the greatest legal responsibility on respondent States to comply 
with the specified remedial indications. 
 
Remedial Indications Given in Operative Part of Judgments Final in 2013 
Type of Remedy Individual Measures Individual and 
General Measures 
General Measures 
Importance Level of 
Cases: Case Reports 
2 1 1 
Level 1    
Level 2 2   
Level 3    
 
During 2014 the Court only prescribed remedial measures in the operative part of two 
final judgments. Both of those cases were Level 1 judgments, one judgment indicated 
individual measures and the other case indicated general measures. In 2015 just one 
final judgment prescribed remedial measures, that was a Level 2 case and individual 
measures were specified. So we can deduce that operative part indications do tend to be 
found in the higher importance levels of cases (6 prescribed in Case Reports and Level 1 
judgments compared with 3 prescribed in Level 2 judgments). However, it is notable 
that there has been a dramatic decline in the annual numbers of final judgments 
containing operative part remedial indications over the last three years. 
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We shall now focus our attention on the contemporary jurisprudence in order to 
discover important features of the Court’s reasoning concerning the indication of 
remedial measures. We will begin with ascertaining the reasons given by the Court for 
indicating remedial measures. The first reason we can identify in a number of cases is 
that the application discloses a systemic problem in domestic legal or administrative 
arrangements. A classic example of the Court giving Article 46 indications as the 
application revealed a systemic problem in national legislation was Statileo v Croatia42. 
The applicant landlord owned a flat in Split and he complained that national law 
prevented him obtaining an adequate rent for his flat. The Court was unanimous in 
finding a breach of his right to protection of property. However, as well as awarding him 
several thousand euros compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage the 
Court ruled that: 
Whilst in finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the 
present instance the Court has primarily focused on the particular circumstances of 
the applicant’s case, it adds by way of a general observation that the problem 
underlying that violation concerns the legislation itself and that its findings extend 
beyond the sole interests of the applicant in the instant case... This is therefore a 
case where the Court considers that the respondent State should take appropriate 
legislative and/or other general measures to secure a rather delicate balance 
between the interests of landlords, including their entitlement to derive profit from 
their property, and the general interest of the community – including the 
availability of sufficient accommodation for the less well-off – in accordance with 
the principles of the protection of property rights under the Convention... In this 
connection the Court has noted that legislative reform is currently under way… It is 
not for the Court to specify how the rights of landlords and lessees…should be 
balanced against each other. The Court has already identified the main 
shortcomings in the current legislation, namely, the inadequate level of protected 
rent in view of statutory financial burdens imposed on landlords, restrictive 
conditions for the termination of protected lease, and the absence of any temporal 
limitation to the protected lease scheme…43 
So the Court identified a number of defects in the domestic legislative scheme regulating 
rents and recognized that those failings had implications going beyond the complaint 
lodged by the applicant. Therefore, the Court went on to indicate that the respondent 
State should take general remedial measures. However, given the need to balance the 
potentially conflicting interests of landlords and tenants, the Court did not seek to 
prescribe the specific details of the legislative reform that was necessary for Croatia 
enact. 
 A dramatic example of the Court indicating remedial measures when it had found 
repeated failings in the judicial and parliamentary processes involved in the dismissal of 
a Supreme Court judge occurred in Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine44. The Ukrainian Higher 
Council of the Judiciary (HCJ) had decided to submit to Parliament that the applicant 
should be dismissed from the judiciary. Subsequently a parliamentary vote approved his 
dismissal. He had then unsuccessfully challenged his dismissal before the Higher 
Administrative Court (HAC). At Strasbourg the Chamber was unanimous in finding, inter 
alia,  several violations of Article 6(1) during the proceedings against applicant; including 
the appearance of personal bias regarding some members of the HCJ who participated in 
the proceeding against the applicant, a lack of appropriate guarantees of objective 
impartiality at the parliamentary committee stage of those proceedings and the absence 
of safeguards concerning the independence and impartiality of the HAC when considering 
the applicant’s challenge to his dismissal. Alongside ordering the individual measure of 
                                           
42 Judgment of 10 July 2014. 
 
43 Ibid. at para. 165. 
 
44 Judgment of 9 January 2013. 
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the applicant’s reinstatement as a Supreme Court judge (discussed further below at 
p.16) and reserving the issue of pecuniary damage for his financial losses, the Chamber 
stated that: 
…the present case discloses serious systemic problems as regards the functioning 
of the Ukrainian judiciary. In particular, the violations found in the case suggest 
that the system of judicial discipline in Ukraine has not been organised in a proper 
way, as it does not ensure sufficient separation of the judiciary from other 
branches of State power. Moreover, it does not provide appropriate guarantees 
against abuse and misuse of disciplinary measures to the detriment of judicial 
independence, the latter being one of the most important values underpinning the 
effective functioning of democracies. 
200. The Court considers that the nature of the violations found suggests that for 
the proper execution of the present judgment the respondent State would be 
required to take a number of general measures aimed at reforming the system of 
judicial discipline. These measures should include legislative reform involving the 
restructuring of the institutional basis of the system. Furthermore, these measures 
should entail the development of appropriate forms and principles of coherent 
application of domestic law in this field.45 
Hence the case had exposed fundamental organisational weaknesses in the Ukrainian 
judicial disciplinary system that needed legislative and attitudinal changes to meet the 
basic requirements of the ECHR. 
 A different form of systemic judicial failure prompted the Court to indicate general 
measures in Barta and Drajko v Hungary46. The applicants complained about the 
unreasonable length of time the criminal tax fraud proceedings against them had taken. 
It was nearly four years after they had been charged that the District Court convicted 
and fined them. The united Chamber found a breach of the reasonable time guarantee 
contained in Article 6(1) of the Convention and awarded the applicants nearly double 
their fines in non-pecuniary damages. Furthermore, the Chamber noted: 
 
…that the violation of the applicants’ right to a trial within a reasonable time is not 
an isolated incident, but rather a systemic problem that has resulted from 
inadequate legislation and inefficiency in the administration of justice. 
…Although it is in principle not for the Court to determine what remedial measures 
may be appropriate to satisfy the respondent State’s obligations under Article 46 of 
the Convention, in view of the systemic situation which it has identified, the Court 
would observe that general measures at national level are undoubtedly called for in 
execution of the present judgment, measures which must take into account the 
large number of persons affected. 
…To prevent future violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time, the 
respondent State should take all appropriate steps, preferably by amending the 
existing range of legal remedies or creating new ones, to secure genuinely effective 
redress for violations similar to the present one.47 
Here the systemic failure was the product of both defective legislation and weaknesses in 
the operation of the criminal justice process and general measures were necessary to 
remedy the Convention violations. 
 It is not only newer State Parties to the ECHR who have been found to have 
persistent failings in their judicial systems that prompt the Court to indicate general 
remedies. For example in McCaughey and Others v UK48, the Chamber identified  
                                           
45 Ibid. at paras. 199-200. 
 
46 Judgment of 17 December 2013. 
 
47 Ibid. at paras. 42, 47 and 49. 
 
48 Judgment of 16 July 2013. 
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systematic delays in Northern Irish inquests examining deaths caused by actions of the 
security forces. The applicants had two relatives shot dead by members of a specialist 
unit of the British Army outside a suspected arms dump of the IRA during 1990, the 
latter organisation publicly announced the deceased were “volunteers” on “active 
service” at the time of their deaths. Eventually, after numerous court proceedings 
brought by the applicants, the inquest jury delivered its verdict in 2012; but the jurors 
were not able to reach unanimous views on a number of key issues surrounding the 
killing of the applicants’ relatives. The Chamber, unanimously, decided that there had 
been a breach of the procedural duty implicit in Article 2 of the Convention because of 
the excessive investigation delays. Furthermore the Chamber observed that: “the 
carrying out of investigations, including holding inquests, into killings by the security 
forces in Northern Ireland has been marked by major delays. It further considers that 
such delays remain a serious and extensive problem in Northern Ireland.”49 Therefore, in 
the operative part of its judgment, the Chamber held that, “the Government take, as a 
matter of some priority, all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure, in the 
present case and in similar cases concerning killings by the security forces in Northern 
Ireland where inquests are pending, that the procedural requirements of Article 2 are 
complied with expeditiously.”50 
 The second common reason why the Court indicates remedial measures is 
because the violation(s) disclosed in the application may generate significant numbers of 
future complaints to the Court unless general measures are taken to solve the 
underlying problem. In Suso Musa v Malta51, the Sierra Leone national had been 
detained for eighteen months following his irregular entry to Malta by boat and the 
rejection of his claim for asylum. The united Chamber upheld the applicant’s claims that 
his detention and lack of effective judicial remedies to challenge his incarceration 
violated Articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the Convention. In addition to ordering the payment of 
24,000 euros compensation for his non-pecuniary damage the Chamber determined 
that: 
…the problems detected in the applicant’s particular case may subsequently give 
rise to numerous other well-founded applications which are a threat to the future 
effectiveness of the system put in place by the Convention...The Court’s concern is 
to facilitate the rapid and effective suppression of a defective national system 
hindering human-rights protection. In that connection, and having regard to the 
situation which it has identified above … the Court considers that general measures 
at national level are undoubtedly called for in execution of the present judgment. 
122. In the instant case the Court considers that it is necessary, in view of its 
finding of a violation of Article 5 § 4, to indicate the general measures required to 
prevent other similar violations in the future. It observes that it has found a 
violation of Article 5 § 4 on account of the fact that none of the remedies available 
in Malta could be considered speedy for the purposes of that provision. Thus, the 
Court considers that the respondent State must above all, through appropriate 
legal and/or other measures, secure in its domestic legal order a mechanism which 
allows individuals taking proceedings to determine the lawfulness of their detention 
to obtain a determination of their claim within Convention-compatible time-limits, 
but which nevertheless maintains the relevant procedural safeguards… 
123. The Court notes that it has also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on account in 
particular of the duration of the applicant’s detention coupled with the inadequate 
conditions at the barracks where he was held. Having regard to that finding, the 
Court recommends that the respondent State envisage taking the necessary 
general measures to ensure an improvement in those conditions and to limit 
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detention periods so that they remain connected to the ground of detention 
applicable in an immigration context.52 
Hence we can deduce that there is potentially an overlap between this reason for 
indicating general measures in order to try and prevent repetitive/clone complaints in 
the future overwhelming the Court and the first reason we identified, that of the Court 
addressing systematic defects in national legal and administrative systems, as both 
reasons are predicated on the Court encountering a major failing in the domestic respect 
for Convention rights. 
 In Luli and Others v Albania53, the Court was faced with a number of applicants 
complaining about the length of time their property claims had remained undetermined, 
for many years, by the domestic authorities in breach of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The 
Chamber, unanimously, found a violation of that provision in several of the applications. 
The Chamber stated that its findings: 
…demonstrate that excessive length is becoming “a serious deficiency in domestic 
legal proceedings”. There are already dozens of similar applications before the 
Court. The growing number of applications is not only an aggravating factor as 
regards the State’s responsibility under the Convention, but also represent a threat 
to the future effectiveness of the system put in place by the Convention, given that 
in the Court’s view, the legal deficiency identified in the applicants’ particular cases 
may subsequently give rise to other numerous well-founded applications. 
…the Court’s concern is to facilitate the rapid and effective suppression of a 
malfunction found in the national system of human-rights protection. In that 
connection and having regard to the systemic situation which it has identified… the 
Court considers that general measures at the national level are undoubtedly called 
for in the execution of the present judgment including, in particular, introducing a 
domestic remedy as regards undue length of proceedings.54 
Key features of such a remedy, derived from previous case-law, were then elaborate by 
the Chamber. So in the different context of unreasonable delays in domestic judicial 
decision-making violating Article 6(1) of the Convention the Court indicated general 
remedies to try and reduce the large flow of complaints from Albania, amongst many 
other States55, on this problem. 
 The final example we shall examine of the Court citing concerns about future 
applications raising the same complaint as a reason for the Court to indicate general 
remedial measures involved the regime and conditions of life imprisonment existing in 
Bulgaria. The two convicted murderers in Harakchiev and Tolumov v Bulgaria56, 
complained, inter alia, that they were kept in constantly locked cells away from other 
prisoners. This led the Chamber, unanimously, to conclude that the applicants’ 
conditions of detention infringed Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, that violation: 
…discloses a systemic problem that has already given rise to similar applications … 
and may give rise to more such applications. The nature of the breach suggests 
that to properly execute this judgment, the respondent State would be required to 
reform, preferably by means of legislation, the legal framework governing the 
prison regime applicable to persons sentenced to life imprisonment with or without 
parole. That reform, invariably recommended by the [Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment] since 1999… 
should entail (a) removing the automatic application of the highly restrictive prison 
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regime currently applicable, as a rule, to all life prisoners for an initial period of at 
least five years, and (b) putting in place provisions envisaging that a special 
security regime can only be imposed – and maintained – on the basis of an 
individual risk assessment of each life prisoner, and applied for no longer than 
strictly necessary.57 
So, interestingly, the Court was drawing upon the expert recommendations of its fellow 
Council of Europe body to provide the substance of its indicated general remedial 
measures that were necessary to prevent further breaches by Bulgaria. 
 The third reason we can identify in the contemporary jurisprudence for the Court 
indicating remedial measures is that used in the pioneering judgment of Assanidze, 
discussed above58, and it is the nature of the breach of the Convention found by the 
Court leaves no choice as to the remedial measure necessary to rectify the violation. A 
modern example of this reason being invoked by the Grand Chamber in an analogous 
scenario was Del Rio Prada v Spain59. The applicant was convicted of 23 murders and 
other serious crimes connected with domestic terrorism for which she received numerous 
lengthy prison sentences (totalling over 3000 years detention). However, the courts 
informed her that her individual sentences would be aggregated into one sentence of 
thirty years’ imprisonment. When the prison authorities sought permission to release her 
after approximately twenty years’ imprisonment, due to remission earned by her positive 
activities whilst serving her sentence, the courts  applied a new precedent and denied 
her early release. She successfully complained to Strasbourg alleging breaches of Article 
7 (retrospective imposition of a higher penalty) and Article 5(1) (unlawful detention after 
the passing of her remission release date) of the ECHR. Spain requested the Grand 
Chamber to rehear the case, under Article 43 of the Convention. An overwhelming 
majority, fifteen votes to two, upheld the Chamber’s decision that there had been a 
breach of Article 7 and unanimously that the applicant’s continued imprisonment since 
the expiry of her original remission release date violated Article 5(1). The Grand 
Chamber indicated that the applicant should be “released at the earliest possible date”60, 
because: 
…In other exceptional cases, the nature of the violation found may be such as to 
leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it and the Court may 
decide to indicate only one such measure (see Assanidze v. Georgia…). 
139. The Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber’s finding and considers that the 
present case belongs to this last-mentioned category.61 
This judgment confirms that the Court may decide that the flagrant continued unlawful 
detention of an applicant in breach of Article 5(1) justifies the indication of the individual 
remedial measure of immediate release of the successful applicant. 
 The contemporary Court has also cited the nature of the respondent State’s 
breach as the reason for indicating individual measures in the different context of a 
violation of Article 3 in Amirov v Russia62. The applicant who suffered from many serious 
health problems, including spinal paralysis, complained about the lack of specialist 
medical care he was receiving during his pre-trial detention. The unanimous Chamber 
determined that the prolonged inadequate medical care given to the applicant 
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.  
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117. In the instant case the Court considers that it is necessary, in view of its 
finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, to indicate individual measures 
for the execution of this judgment. It has found a violation of that Article on 
account of the failure of the Russian authorities to provide the applicant, a 
seriously ill-person whose life is at risk, with the requisite level of medical care. 
118. The Court considers that in order to redress the effects of the breach of the 
applicant’s rights, the authorities should admit him to a specialised medical facility 
where he would remain under constant medical supervision and would be provided 
with adequate medical services corresponding to his needs. Nothing in this 
judgment should be seen as an obstacle to his placement in a specialised prison 
medical facility if it is established that the facility can guarantee the requisite level 
of medical supervision and care.63 
So here, again, the nature of the serious breach was such that the Court considered 
specific individual measures were required to remedy that violation. 
 A much rarer example of the contemporary jurisprudence revealing the Court 
using the nature of the violation reason to justify the indication of general measures 
occurred in Benzer and Others v Turkey64. In that case 41 individuals complained that 
the bombing of their villages by Turkish military aircraft, as part of a long-running 
campaign against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), caused the deaths of 34 of the 
applicants’ close relatives and the injuring of some of the applicants. The Chamber, 
unanimously, found, inter alia, unlawful killings of some of the applicants’ relatives in 
breach of Article 2 and a procedural failure of that Article as the authorities had not 
conducted an effective investigation into those deaths. Alongside ordering the payment 
of non-pecuniary damages to specified applicants (amounting to six-figure sums for 
some), the Chamber repeated its commonly used phraseology about the nature of the 
violation leaving no choice of remedial measure.65 The Chamber then stated: 
Having regard to the fact that the investigation file is still open at the national 
level, and having further regard to the documents in its possession, the Court 
considers it inevitable that new investigatory steps should be taken under the 
supervision of the Committee of Ministers. In particular, the steps to be taken by 
the national authorities in order to prevent impunity should include the carrying out 
of an effective criminal investigation, with the help of the flight log [a photocopy of 
the flight log of identified Turkish Air Force fighter jets operations on the day of the 
bombings supplied to the Court by the applicants], with a view to identifying and 
punishing those responsible for the bombing of the applicants’ two villages.66 
The Committee of Ministers characterised this as an indication of general measures by 
the Court67, presumably this was because of the scale of the investigation obligations 
required of Turkey given the number of successful applicants in the proceedings. 
 The fourth reason we can identify in the contemporary case-law for the Court 
indicating remedial measures is the Court’s belief that to do so will assist the respondent 
State in complying with its obligations under Article 46. We can see the Grand Chamber 
deploying this reason in the tragic case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of 
Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania68. The applicant non-governmental organisation brought 
the case on behalf of the deceased applicant who had died in a neuropsychiatric hospital 
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at the age of nineteen. He had been diagnosed as HIV positive at the age of five and he 
also suffered from a very low IQ. In addition Valentin had been brought-up in an 
orphanage. At eighteen the local Child Protection Panel determined that given his age he 
should be discharged from local authority care and transferred to a neuropsychiatric 
hospital (contrary to the recommendations of his social worker). Valentin’s physical and 
mental health deteriorated over the ensuing months and he died a few months later. The 
Grand Chamber, unanimously, concluded that Romania had violated both the 
substantive and procedural aspects of Article 2 of the ECHR in its treatment of Valentin. 
After noting that: 
…with a view to assisting the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 
46, the Court may seek to indicate the type of individual and/or general measures 
that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist… 
…the Court recommends that the respondent State envisage the necessary general 
measures to ensure that mentally disabled persons in a situation comparable to 
that of Mr Câmpeanu, are afforded independent representation, enabling them to 
have Convention complaints relating to their health and treatment examined before 
a court or other independent body…69 
So the Grand Chamber was indicating the types of general remedial measures that were 
necessary for Romania to take in order to comply with its Article 46 duty to abide by 
final judgments to which it was a party. 
 A united Chamber used this reason to indicate specific legislative reform that was 
necessary in Aitman v Turkey70. The applicant was travelling down a hill in a lorry when 
gendarmes ordered the vehicle to be stopped, as they suspected it was being used in the 
smuggling of fuel. The applicant claimed he shouted to the gendarmes that the brakes 
had failed and the lorry could not be halted. However, after firing warning shots in the 
air the gendarmes shot the applicant in the hip. Section 39 of the Regulation on the 
Duties and Powers of the Gendarmerie provided that those officers could use their 
firearms when smugglers disobeyed an order to stop and ignored a warning shot being 
fired in the air. The Chamber upheld the applicant’s claims that he had suffered a breach 
of both the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the ECHR due to the actions 
of the gendarmes and a lack of independence in the investigation into the shooting. After 
using similar language as in Valentin, above, to explain why it was indicating remedial 
measures the Chamber stated that: 
…in order to execute the present judgment, in accordance with its obligations 
under Article 46 of the Convention, the respondent State will have to make the 
relevant legislative amendments to prevent similar violations in the future. To that 
end, the Court considers that section 39 of the Regulation on the Powers and 
Duties of the Gendarmerie should be amended to ensure that the relevant 
provisions are in compliance with Article 22 of Law no. 5607 on the Prevention of 
Smuggling [this provides that officers may only use firearms in self-defence when a 
suspect uses firearms].71 
Hence in this case the Court was being much more precise in detailing what general 
remedial measures needed to be enacted. 
 It is also worth noting that in some cases where the Court indicates remedial 
measures parties to the proceedings have made express pleas for the Court to adopt 
such a course of action. For example in McCaughey72, the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (a non-governmental Northern Irish human rights 
organization), which had been given permission to submit third-party comments, 
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“proposed” that the Court make an Article 46 ruling.73 As we have already discussed 
above, the Court went on to provide such an indication in the operative part of its 
judgment. 
 
4. Operative part indications 
 
 The next issue for us to consider is the reasons we can discern for the Court 
deciding that it is going to indicate remedial measures in the operative part of its 
judgment. We can identify two sets of reasons for operative part indications in the 
contemporary jurisprudence. Firstly, in several cases, the Court refers to a combination 
of the nature of the Convention violation leaving no real choice regarding the individual 
remedial measures necessary to remedy the breach and the urgent need to end the 
breach.  For example in Grande Stevens and Others v Italy74, the applicants successfully 
complained, inter alia, that their ongoing prosecutions in respect of allegedly 
disseminating false information regarding the financing of shareholdings in the FIAT 
automotive company, after they had been fined, millions of euros, by the National 
Companies and Stock Exchange Commission (CNSOB) for market manipulation 
concerning the same activities  violated Article 4 of Protocol No 7 (right not to be tried or 
punished twice) to the ECHR. The Chamber, unanimously, determined that: 
…as regards individual measures, the Court considers that in the present case the 
nature of the violation found is such as to leave no real choice as to the measures 
required to remedy it. 
237. In these conditions, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case 
and the urgent need to put an end to the violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the 
Court considers that the respondent State must ensure that the new set of criminal 
proceedings brought against the applicants in violation of that provision and which, 
according to the most recent information received, are still pending, are closed as 
rapidly as possible and without adverse consequences for the applicants…75 
The Chamber subsequently included the latter instruction in its operative provisions.76 A 
differently composed Chamber had used similar language in the earlier case of  
Oleksandr Volkov77. The united Chamber ordered that “Ukraine shall secure the 
applicant’s reinstatement to the post of judge of the Supreme Court at the earliest 
possible date.”78 
 The combination of the nature of the violation and the urgency of ending the 
breach were cited by the Grand Chamber as the basis for its operative part indication in 
Del Rio Prada79. A fascinating aspect of that ruling was Judge Mahoney’s dissent against 
the operative part indication.80 He did not believe that the breach of Article 5 in the 
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applicant’s case was sufficiently serious to justify the Court making such an order. For 
him the breach of her right to liberty, due to the lack of foreseeability of Spanish law 
governing the calculation of prisoner release dates, was not of the same magnitude as  
in the earlier classic operative part release indications ordered in Assanidze81 and Illascu 
and Others82. This unusual dissent on an operative part indication highlights the gravity 
of the breach of the Convention is a key component in the Court’s decision to give such 
an indication. The fact that the Spanish government secured the applicant’s release from 
prison the day after the Grand Chamber delivered its judgment is a practical 
demonstration of the authority accorded to operative part indications.83 
 The second reason we can identify in the contemporary case-law for the Court 
specifying remedial measures in the operative part of its judgments is that the case 
discloses a systemic problem that needs to be resolved. For example in Zorica Jovanovic 
v Serbia84, the applicant complained that in 1983 her healthy newborn baby had been 
taken from her in a hospital and subsequently the authorities had informed her that the 
baby had died. The authorities failed to provide an adequate explanation of the fate of 
her baby and the body of the baby was never returned to the applicant and her family. 
From the early years of this century the Serbian media began to report on numerous 
similar experiences of other families. Many of these families believed that their babies 
had not in fact died, but had been passed on to other persons. In 2005 hundreds of 
parents who claimed that their babies had gone missing from Serbian hospitals during 
the last three decades of the twentieth century petitioned the Serbian Parliament for 
redress. During 2006 the Parliament published a report which, inter alia, concluded that 
there had been serious defects in the legislation and practices of the authorities in those 
years, these failing justified the parents’ concerns about the fate of their babies and 
changes to legislation together with action by public authorities was necessary to provide 
the parents with redress. Four years later the Serbian Ombudsman issued a report 
finding, inter alia, that in previous times medical opinion was that parents should be 
relieved from the mental anguish of having to deal with the burial of their newborn 
babies, autopsy reports on such death were frequently inconclusive and of dubious 
accuracy and that the government’s response since 2006 had been inadequate. Before 
the Court the applicant contended that the authorities continuing failure to provide her 
with information about the real fate of her son amounted to a breach of her right respect 
for her family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. The Chamber, unanimously, 
found a violation of that right due to the authorities’ persistent failure to provide her with 
credible information as to what had happened to her baby. She was awarded 10,000 
euros compensation for her non-pecuniary damage. Noting that the applicant had 
requested that Serbia be ordered to amend its legislation, the Court ruled that: 
In view of the above, as well as the significant number of potential applicants, the 
respondent State must, within one year from the date on which the present 
judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, take 
all appropriate measures, preferably by means of a lex specialis … to secure the 
establishment of a mechanism aimed at providing individual redress to all parents 
in a situation such as, or sufficiently similar to, the applicant’s... This mechanism 
should be supervised by an independent body, with adequate powers, which would 
be capable of providing credible answers regarding the fate of each child and 
awarding adequate compensation as appropriate.85 
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The Chamber repeated this obligation in the operative part of its judgment86 together 
with a decision that similar applications pending before the Court should be adjourned 
during the one year timeframe87. These operative part determinations by the Chamber 
reveal Zorica Jovanovic to be a paradigm example of what we have previously discussed 
have been referred to as “quasi-pilot judgments”88. This is because the Court identified a 
systemic problem in the respondent State, instructed that State to take specific general 
remedial measures and, within a defined period of time, the Court adjourned similar 
pending applications. The only differences from a formal pilot judgment were that the 
Court did not expressly invoke the pilot judgment procedure89 nor formally so designate 
its judgment. 
 Other contemporary cases disclose that the Court may include general remedial 
directions in the operative part of its judgments when systemic defects have been found, 
but without the Court deciding to suspend the consideration of similar pending 
applications. An example was Vlad and Others v Romania90, in which the three applicants 
complained about excessive delays in their criminal and civil trials violating their right to 
reasonable speed in the determination of criminal charges and civil rights provided by 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The united Chamber upheld those complaints and after 
positively acknowledging legislative reforms enacted by the respondent State decided 
that: 
However, in view of the extent of the recurrent problem at issue, and in the light of 
the identified weaknesses and shortcomings of the legal remedies indicated by the 
respondent State… consistent and long-term efforts, such as the adoption of 
further measures, must continue in order to achieve complete compliance with 
Articles 6, 13 and 46 of the Convention.91 
In the operative part of its judgment the Chamber held that the violations were caused 
by the “malfunctioning” of Romanian legislation and practice92 and directed the creation 
of a domestic compensatory remedy for those who had suffered from unreasonably 
lengthy judicial proceedings.93 We may speculate that the Court did not adjourn other 
similar pending cases so as to maintain the pressure of future Strasbourg litigation on 
Romania to deal with its systemic judicial delay problems.94 
 In recent times the Court has also included individual remedial directions in the 
operative part of a judgment which dealt with a continuing systemic problem that had 
been subject to an earlier judgment containing both Article 46 and operative part 
indications. The underlying problem in Duric and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina95, was 
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the large number, over 10,000, of unenforced war damage judgments delivered by the 
domestic courts against the Republika Srpska (one of the two constituent entities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). The damages awarded in those judgments totalled about 75 
million euros. In 2009 the Court had found breaches of Article 6(1) and Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention in respect of fifteen applicants whose war damage 
judgments had not been enforced.96 Having noted the scale of the problem, there were 
over 100 similar complaints pending before the Court, the Chamber invoked Article 46 to 
express the view that the respondent State should grant adequate redress to all those 
persons. Furthermore, the Chamber required, in the operative part of its judgment97 the 
State to secure enforcement of the applicants’ domestic war damages. Subsequently the 
domestic settlement plan for Republika Srpska war damage judgments had its time-
frame extended from thirteen to twenty years. In Duric, where some of the applicants’ 
domestic judgments had not been enforced for thirteen years, the Court applied Article 
46 to express the view that the settlement plan should be amended to include “a more 
appropriate”98 (i.e. shorter) time for payment. Additionally the operative part of the 
judgment ordered the respondent State to secure the enforcement of the applicant’s 
domestic damages within three months.99 So we may deduce that a State’s repeated 
failure to resolve a wide-scale problem resulting in repetitive applications to the Court 
was the catalyst for the operative part indication of individual remedial measures 
involving the swift enforcement of long-overdue domestic judgments. 
 
5. The legal foundations of indicated remedial measures 
The primary legal foundation of the Court indicating non-financial remedial measures 
is Article 46 of the ECHR. This is reflected in the Court’s frequent inclusion of a sub-
heading in relevant judgments entitled “Application of Article 46 of the Convention” after 
which the Court expresses its remedial indications. Furthermore, as we have discussed 
above, the Committee of Ministers has categorised these cases as “Article 46 
judgments”.100  Judge Sicilianos has also identified other legal bases including Article 32 
of the ECHR101. In his opinion, “it is important to highlight that Article 32 of the 
Convention constitutes a clear basis for the Court to decide whether or not to be 
involved in the execution of its own judgments and that the Court itself has repeatedly 
relied upon this provision in order to do so.”102 Looking beyond the text of the 
Convention he considers the “subsequent practice” in the application of the ECHR as 
another legal basis for the Court’s remedial indications. Citing Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties he notes that “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation” is a factor which can be used to construe treaties. As, “it seems that no 
State Party to the Convention has ever supported the view- either before the Court or 
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elsewhere- that the Court lacks jurisdiction to indicate execution measures in general. 
Taking into consideration the number of the relevant judgments of the Court, the 
general attitude of the contracting parties denotes their acquiescence in this respect.”103 
Therefore he concludes that there is a “solid legal basis”104 for the Court to indicate 
remedial measures but he cautions that this power is complementary to the primary 
responsibility of the Committee of Ministers regarding the supervision of the execution of 
Court judgments. 
 
6. Implications of the Court indicating remedial measures 
The consequences of the Court indicating non-financial remedial measures on the 
Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the execution of such judgments and the 
reactions of respondent States are topics worthy of a separate study. Nevertheless some 
provisional conclusions can be derived from this piece of research. It appears highly 
likely that when the Court issues an Article 46 judgment the Committee of Ministers will 
subsequently decide to subject that judgment to the more intense “enhanced procedure” 
of supervision.105 This exceptional procedure is reserved for cases involving one or more 
of the following criteria: “-judgments requiring urgent individual measures;- pilot 
judgments;- judgments disclosing major structural and/or complex problems as 
identified by the Court and/or the Committee of Ministers;- interstate cases.” 
[italics/bold as in original text]106 The Committee of Ministers decided to subject all but 
one of the seventeen Article 46 judgments that became final in 2013 to the enhanced 
procedure.107 Similarly all thirteen of the Article 46 judgments that became final in 2015 
were placed under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers.108 Inexplicably 
the Committee of Ministers had only placed ten (out of twenty-three) Article 46 
judgments that became final in 2014 on the enhanced procedure by the time of the 
publication of the Committee’s annual supervisory report.109 However, overall during our 
survey period the vast majority of Article 46 judgments were accorded enhanced 
supervision by the Committee of Ministers. 
Where the Court indicates a non-financial remedy in the operative part of its 
judgment our study reveals that the Committee of Ministers and/or the respondent State 
may be able to secure/provide a satisfactory remedy more swiftly than where the Article 
46 indication is contained in the text of the judgment. The most dramatic example of 
that process in action was in Del Rio Prada where, as we have already noted, the 
Government obtained the release of the applicant from prison the day after the Grand 
Chamber delivered its judgment.110 The Committee of Ministers gained Hungarian police 
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protection for the vulnerable applicants in R.R. and Others v Hungary111, within about 
eighteen months of the Court so indicating (in the operative part of its judgment) that 
adequate protection should be provided to the mother and her children. However, the  
Committee of Ministers’ Deputies had found it necessary to express its “concern”, at a 
supervisory meeting in September 2014, that such protection had not been provided 
more than a year after the judgment became final.112 After two years and four meetings 
of the Ministers’ Deputies113, during which the Deputies had noted the “unconditional 
obligation” on Ukraine to reinstate Judge Oleksandr Volkov to his position on the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court and the Deputies had issued an Interim Resolution calling for 
his reinstatement114, he was restored to his judicial office (a few weeks after the 
publication of the Interim Resolution).115 The other three judgments containing operative 
part indications that became final during 2013 were still pending before the Minister’s 
Deputies in November 2016.116 
By way of comparison if we examine the progress in achieving remedies where the 
Court indicated non-financial remedies in the text of judgments becoming final during 
2013 we discover that only one117 (out of eleven) case had been closed by the 
Committee of Ministers (as the latter were satisfied that all individual and general 
remedial measures had been undertaken by the respondent State) by the end of 
September 2016.118 The ten remaining cases were still pending before the Committee of 
Ministers, but one119 had been transferred from enhanced to standard supervision due to 
progress in the provision of general measures by the respondent State. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
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We have discovered how in recent times the Court has indicated non-financial 
remedies in nearly six times more “Article 46 judgment” cases than in formal pilot 
judgment cases (there were 53 final Article 46 judgments delivered in the three years 
2013-2015 compared with 9 final pilot judgments). Surprisingly we have also 
ascertained that during this time the Court has been indicating general remedial 
measures far more frequently than individual measures (general measures were 
indicated in 33 final judgments between 2013-2015 compared with 10 final judgments 
indicating individual measures). This may be seen as a reflection of Professor Leach’s 
description of Article 46 judgments as decisions which “highlight systemic or structural 
problems which have been the source of repeated Convention violations.”120 Indeed, as 
our analysis has shown, the leading reasons underlying the Court’s willingness to 
indicate non-financial remedial measures are that the case discloses a systemic problem 
and/or the violation(s) found by the Court may generate significant numbers of similar 
complaints in the future. These systemic defects encompassed a range of Convention 
Articles, including Article 2121, Article 3122, Article 5123, Article 6124 and Article 1 of 
Protocol No.1125 Consequently we may postulate that the issuing of Article 46 judgments 
has been one of the strategies adopted by the Court to respond to the persistent 
problem of repetitive/clone complaints which account for about half of the backlog of 
pending cases before the Court.126 
Other reasons justifying the Court indicating remedial measures we discovered in the 
case law were the nature of the breach of ECHR rights, for example domestic authorities 
failing to effectively investigate civilian deaths (allegedly caused by military bombing) 
violating the implied procedural limb of Article 2127, and to help respondent States 
comply with their remedial obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, such as 
securing independent representation to safeguard the well-being of mentally disabled 
persons128. Again these judgments often dealt with violations that were of a wide-scale 
and needed general remedial measures to redress the breaches of the Convention found 
by the Court. Though our research has also revealed that the Court has been willing to 
indicate general remedial measures in cases falling within the lower importance 
categories of judgments (24 judgments classified as of Levels 2 and 3 compared to 9 
judgments in Case Reports and Level 1). 
 Turning to the most powerful non-financial remedial judgments where the Court 
delivered its instructions in the operative part of the judgment we have seen that 
individual measures have been prescribed far more often than general measures (6 
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judgments specified individual measures and two judgments elaborated general 
measures). Also operative part remedial indications were primarily found in high 
importance level cases (six operative part judgments were classified as Case Reports or 
Level 1 cases, while three operative part judgments were Level 2 cases). Given the 
severity of the breaches and the significance of the matters raised in many of these 
cases, including the unfair and biased dismissal of a Supreme Court judge129, the failure 
of public authorities over many years to provide a mother with credible information 
regarding the fate of her baby130 and the launching of duplicate criminal proceedings 
against a defendant131, it is clear why they have been accorded high importance. A 
striking feature is that recent years have witnesses a marked decline in the numbers of 
these rare judgments (from 6 in 2013 to one in 2015).   
In 2016 the Committee of Ministers’ expert Steering Committee for Human Rights 
expressed a frosty attitude towards the Court providing indications of individual and 
general remedial measures in non-pilot judgment cases. “The CDDH does not support a 
regular recourse to this practice, beyond these exceptional cases, where the nature of 
the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measure(s), in 
particular individual ones, required to remedy it.”132  This view is at odds with the 
positive comments previously expressed by the Committee of Ministers regarding Article 
46 judgments in its annual supervisory report.133 One wonders whether the 2016 
expert’s report marks the beginning of a new less supportive attitude by State 
authorities at Strasbourg towards the Court providing these types of remedial 
indications? 
 Whilst it is indisputable that Article 46 judgments are a tiny proportion of the 
Court’s judgments, as the table below demonstrates, they are very significant as the 
Court believes the circumstances of the particular case require the judicial indication of 
non-financial remedial measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of Article 46 judgments 
 
Year Total number of 
judgments delivered 
(a)134 
Number of Article 46 
judgments (b) 
(b) as a percentage 
of (a) 
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2013 916135 17 1.85% 
2014 896136 23 2.56% 
2015 823137 13 1.57% 
 
 
The Court should be supported in exercising this limited remedial jurisdiction under the 
Convention, regarding the indication of individual and/or general measures, where any of 
the grounds identified in the jurisprudence above necessitate such indications for the 
benefit of the applicant (or other persons in a similar situation) and/or the respondent 
State. We have seen that the Court has been extremely cautious in using this power and 
the primary responsibility of the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution of 
Court judgments has not been usurped by excessive judicial remedial activism. 
Nevertheless it would enhance transparency, for the benefit of all the stakeholders 
involved in litigation at Strasbourg, if the Court provided greater clarity in explaining why 
it was using Article 46 to deliver a quasi-pilot judgment (when a systemic defect was 
identified in national law/domestic procedures, general remedial measures were 
indicated and the determination of similar applications suspended) rather than invoking 
the formal pilot judgment procedure in all such cases. 
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